SOUTH OSSETIAN ISSUE

A Georgian woman walks among the rubble of her damaged home in Gori August 10, 2008.

REUTERS/David Mdzinarishvili

A damaged South Ossetian government building is seen in the town of Tskhinvali, some 100km (62 miles) from Tbilisi, August 10, 2008. Georgia has withdrawn its forces from breakaway South Ossetia, where they had been fighting Russian troops for control, the Georgian interior ministry said on Sunday. But the Russian army said Georgian forces were still there. The announcement of a pullout followed three days of fighting in a Georgian push to take control of the pro-Moscow enclave from separatists, which prompted Russia to pour troops into South Ossetia and launch air strikes inside Georgia. REUTERS/David Mdzinarishvili (GEORGIA)

Georgian women cry as they leave their village near the town of Tskhinvali, some 100km (62 miles) from Tbilisi, August 10, 2008. Georgia has withdrawn its forces from breakaway South Ossetia, where they had been fighting Russian troops for control, the Georgian interior ministry said on Sunday. But the Russian army said Georgian forces were still there. The announcement of a pullout followed three days of fighting in a Georgian push to take control of the pro-Moscow enclave from separatists, which prompted Russia to pour troops into South Ossetia and launch air strikes inside Georgia. REUTERS/ Gleb Garanich (GEORGIA)

SOURCE: reuters.com

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Putin Makes His Move
By Robert Kagan
Monday, August 11, 2008; A15
The details of who did what to precipitate Russia's war against Georgia are not very important. Do you recall the precise details of the Sudeten Crisis that led to Nazi Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia? Of course not, because that morally ambiguous dispute is rightly remembered as a minor part of a much bigger drama.
The events of the past week will be remembered that way, too. This war did not begin because of a miscalculation by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. It is a war that Moscow has been attempting to provoke for some time. The man who once called the collapse of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century" has reestablished a virtual czarist rule in Russia and is trying to restore the country to its once-dominant role in Eurasia and the world. Armed with wealth from oil and gas; holding a near-monopoly over the energy supply to Europe; with a million soldiers, thousands of nuclear warheads and the world's third-largest military budget, Vladimir Putin believes that now is the time to make his move.
Georgia's unhappy fate is that it borders a new geopolitical fault line that runs along the western and southwestern frontiers of Russia. From the Baltics in the north through Central Europe and the Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia, a geopolitical power struggle has emerged between a resurgent and revanchist Russia on one side and the European Union and the United States on the other.
Putin's aggression against Georgia should not be traced only to its NATO aspirations or his pique at Kosovo's independence. It is primarily a response to the "color revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia in 2003 and 2004, when pro-Western governments replaced pro-Russian ones. What the West celebrated as a flowering of democracy the autocratic Putin saw as geopolitical and ideological encirclement.
Ever since, Putin has been determined to stop and, if possible, reverse the pro-Western trend on his borders. He seeks not only to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO but also to bring them under Russian control. Beyond that, he seeks to carve out a zone of influence within NATO, with a lesser security status for countries along Russia's strategic flanks. That is the primary motive behind Moscow's opposition to U.S. missile defense programs in Poland and the Czech Republic.
His war against Georgia is part of this grand strategy. Putin cares no more about a few thousand South Ossetians than he does about Kosovo's Serbs. Claims of pan-Slavic sympathy are pretexts designed to fan Russian great-power nationalism at home and to expand Russia's power abroad.
Unfortunately, such tactics always seem to work. While Russian bombers attack Georgian ports and bases, Europeans and Americans, including very senior officials in the Bush administration, blame the West for pushing Russia too hard on too many issues.
It is true that many Russians were humiliated by the way the Cold War ended, and Putin has persuaded many to blame Boris Yeltsin and Russian democrats for this surrender to the West. The mood is reminiscent of Germany after World War I, when Germans complained about the "shameful Versailles diktat" imposed on a prostrate Germany by the victorious powers and about the corrupt politicians who stabbed the nation in the back.
Now, as then, these feelings are understandable. Now, as then, however, they are being manipulated to justify autocracy at home and to convince Western powers that accommodation -- or to use the once-respectable term, appeasement -- is the best policy.
But the reality is that on most of these issues it is Russia, not the West or little Georgia, that is doing the pushing. It was Russia that raised a challenge in Kosovo, a place where Moscow had no discernible interests beyond the expressed pan-Slavic solidarity. It was Russia that decided to turn a minor deployment of a few defensive interceptors in Poland, which could not possibly be used against Russia's vast missile arsenal, into a major geopolitical confrontation. And it is Russia that has precipitated a war against Georgia by encouraging South Ossetian rebels to raise the pressure on Tblisi and make demands that no Georgian leader could accept. If Saakashvili had not fallen into Putin's trap this time, something else would have eventually sparked the conflict.
Diplomats in Europe and Washington believe Saakashvili made a mistake by sending troops to South Ossetia last week. Perhaps. But his truly monumental mistake was to be president of a small, mostly democratic and adamantly pro-Western nation on the border of Putin's Russia.
Historians will come to view Aug. 8, 2008, as a turning point no less significant than Nov. 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. Russia's attack on sovereign Georgian territory marked the official return of history, indeed to an almost 19th-century style of great-power competition, complete with virulent nationalisms, battles for resources, struggles over spheres of influence and territory, and even -- though it shocks our 21st-century sensibilities -- the use of military power to obtain geopolitical objectives. Yes, we will continue to have globalization, economic interdependence, the European Union and other efforts to build a more perfect international order. But these will compete with and at times be overwhelmed by the harsh realities of international life that have endured since time immemorial. The next president had better be ready.
Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes a monthly column for The Post. His most recent book is "The Return of History and the End of Dreams." He served in the State Department in the Reagan administration.
Black Sea Watershed
By Ronald D. Asmus and Richard Holbrooke
Monday, August 11, 2008; A15
In weeks and years past, each of us has argued on this page that Moscow was pursuing a policy of regime change toward Georgia and its pro-Western, democratically elected president, Mikheil Saakashvili. We predicted that, absent strong and unified Western diplomatic involvement, we were headed toward a war. Now, tragically, an escalation of violence in South Ossetia has culminated in a full-scale Russian invasion of Georgia. The West, and especially the United States, could have prevented this war. We have arrived at a watershed moment in the West's post-Cold War relations with Russia.
Exactly what happened in South Ossetia last week is unclear. Each side will argue its own version. But we know, without doubt, that Georgia was responding to repeated provocative attacks by South Ossetian separatists controlled and funded by Moscow. This is a not a war Georgia wanted; it believed that it was slowly gaining ground in South Ossetia through a strategy of soft power.
Whatever mistakes Tblisi has made, they cannot justify Russia's actions. Moscow has invaded a neighbor, an illegal act of aggression that violates the U.N. Charter and fundamental principles of cooperation and security in Europe. Beginning a well-planned war (including cyber-warfare) as the Olympics were opening violates the ancient tradition of a truce to conflict during the Games. And Russia's willingness to create a war zone 25 miles from the Black Sea city of Sochi, where it is to host the Winter Games in 2014, hardly demonstrates its commitment to Olympic ideals. In contrast, Moscow's timing suggests that Putin seeks to overthrow Saakashvili well ahead of our elections, and thus avoid beginning relations with the next president on an overtly confrontational note.
Russia's goal is not simply, as it claims, restoring the status quo in South Ossetia. It wants regime change in Georgia. It has opened a second front in the other disputed Georgian territory, Abkhazia, just south of Sochi. But its greatest goal is to replace Saakashvili -- a man Vladimir Putin despises -- with a president who would be more subject to Moscow's influence. As Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt pointed out Saturday, Moscow's rationale for invading has parallels to the darkest chapters of Europe's history. Having issued passports to tens of thousands of Abkhazians and South Ossetians, Moscow now claims it must intervene to protect them -- a tactic reminiscent of one used by Nazi Germany at the start of World War II.
Moscow seeks to roll back democratic breakthroughs on its borders, to destroy any chance of further NATO or E.U. enlargement and to reestablish a sphere of hegemony over its neighbors. By trying to destroy a democratic, pro-Western Georgia, Moscow is sending a message that, in its part of the world, being close to Washington and the West does not pay.
This moment could well mark the end of an era in Europe during which realpolitik and spheres of influence were supposed to be replaced by new cooperative norms and a country's right to choose its own path. Hopes for a more liberal Russia under President Dmitry Medvedev will need to be reexamined. His justification for this invasion reads more like Brezhnev than Gorbachev. While no one wants a return to Cold War-style confrontation, Moscow's behavior poses a direct challenge to European and international order.
What can we do? First, Georgia deserves our solidarity and support. (Georgia has supported us; its more than 2,000 troops are the third-largest contingent in Iraq -- understandably those troops are being recalled.) We must get the fighting stopped and preserve Georgia's territorial integrity within its current international border. As soon as hostilities cease, there should be a major, coordinated transatlantic effort to help Tblisi rebuild and recover.
Second, we should not pretend that Russia is a neutral peacekeeper in conflicts on its borders. Russia is part of the problem, not the solution. For too long, Moscow has used existing international mandates to pursue neo-imperial policies. We must disavow these mandates and insist on truly neutral international forces, under the United Nations, to monitor a future cease-fire and to mediate.
Third, we need to counter Russian pressure on its neighbors, especially Ukraine -- most likely the next target in Moscow's efforts to create a new sphere of hegemony. The United States and the European Union must be clear that Ukraine and Georgia will not be condemned to some kind of gray zone.
Finally, the United States and the European Union must make clear that this kind of aggression will affect our relations and Russia's standing in the West. While Western military intervention in Georgia is out of the question -- and no one wants a 21st-century version of the Cold War -- Moscow's actions cannot be ignored. There is a vast array of political, economic and other areas in which Russia's role and standing will have to be reexamined. Moscow must also be put on notice that its own prestige project -- the Sochi Olympics -- will be affected by its behavior.
Weak Western diplomacy and lack of transatlantic unity failed to prevent an avoidable war. Only strong transatlantic unity can stop this war and begin to repair the immense damage done. Otherwise, we can add one more issue to the growing list of this administration's foreign policy failures.
Ronald D. Asmus, a deputy assistant secretary of state in the Clinton administration, is executive director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Richard Holbrooke, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in the Clinton administration, writes a monthly column for The Post.
Will Russia Get Away With It?
By WILLIAM KRISTOL
11 August 2008
The New York Times
In August 1924, the small nation of Georgia, occupied by Soviet Russia since 1921, rose up against Soviet rule. On Sept. 16, 1924, The Times of London reported on an appeal by the president of the Georgian Republic to the League of Nations. While ''sympathetic reference to his country's efforts was made'' in the Assembly, the Times said, ''it is realized that the League is incapable of rendering material aid, and that the moral influence which may be a powerful force with civilized countries is unlikely to make any impression upon Soviet Russia.''
''Unlikely'' was an understatement. Georgians did not enjoy freedom again until 1991.
Today, the Vladimir Putins and Hu Jintaos and Mahmoud Ahmadinejads of the world -- to say nothing of their junior counterparts in places like Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma and North Korea -- are no more likely than were Soviet leaders in 1924 to be swayed by ''moral influence.'' Dictators aren't moved by the claims of justice unarmed; aggressors aren't intimidated by diplomacy absent the credible threat of force; fanatics aren't deterred by the disapproval of men of moderation or refinement.
The good news is that today we don't face threats of the magnitude of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. Each of those regimes combined ruthless internal control, a willingness to engage in external aggression, and fervent adherence to an extreme ideology. Today these elements don't coexist in one place. Russia is aggressive, China despotic and Iran messianic -- but none is as dangerous as the 20th-century totalitarian states.
The further good news is that 2008 has been, in one respect, an auspicious year for freedom and democracy. In Iraq, we and our Iraqi allies are on the verge of a strategic victory over the jihadists in what they have called the central front of their struggle. This joint victory has the potential to weaken the jihadist impulse throughout the Middle East.
On the other hand, the ability of Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas to get away with murder (literally), and above all the ability of Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions effectively unchecked, are setbacks for hopes of peace and progress.
And there is no evidence that China's hosting of the Olympics has led to moderation of its authoritarianism. Meanwhile, Russia has sent troops and tanks across an international border, and now seems to be widening its war against Georgia more than its original -- and in any case illegitimate -- casus belli would justify.
Will the United States put real pressure on Russia to stop? In a news analysis on Sunday, the New York Times reporter Helene Cooper accurately captured what I gather is the prevailing view in our State Department: ''While America considers Georgia its strongest ally in the bloc of former Soviet countries, Washington needs Russia too much on big issues like Iran to risk it all to defend Georgia.''
But Georgia, a nation of about 4.6 million, has had the third-largest military presence -- about 2,000 troops -- fighting along with U.S. soldiers and marines in Iraq. For this reason alone, we owe Georgia a serious effort to defend its sovereignty. Surely we cannot simply stand by as an autocratic aggressor gobbles up part of -- and perhaps destabilizes all of -- a friendly democratic nation that we were sponsoring for NATO membership a few months ago.
For that matter, consider the implications of our turning away from Georgia for other aspiring pro-Western governments in the neighborhood, like Ukraine's. Shouldn't we therefore now insist that normal relations with Russia are impossible as long as the aggression continues, strongly reiterate our commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, and offer emergency military aid to Georgia?
Incidentally, has Russia really been helping much on Iran? It has gone along with -- while delaying -- three United Nations Security Council resolutions that have imposed mild sanctions on Iran. But it has also supplied material for Iran's nuclear program, and is now selling Iran antiaircraft systems to protect military and nuclear installations.
It's striking that dictatorial and aggressive and fanatical regimes -- whatever their differences -- seem happy to work together to weaken the influence of the United States and its democratic allies. So Russia helps Iran. Iran and North Korea help Syria. Russia and China block Security Council sanctions against Zimbabwe. China props up the regimes in Burma and North Korea.
The United States, of course, is not without resources and allies to deal with these problems and threats. But at times we seem oddly timid and uncertain.
When the ''civilized world'' expostulated with Russia about Georgia in 1924, the Soviet regime was still weak. In Germany, Hitler was in jail. Only 16 years later, Britain stood virtually alone against a Nazi-Soviet axis. Is it not true today, as it was in the 1920s and '30s, that delay and irresolution on the part of the democracies simply invite future threats and graver dangers?

Российские спецслужбы предприняли широкомасштабную атаку на сервера Day.Az

Российские хакеры по наводке спецслужб России предприняли беспрецедентную атаку на сервера азербайджанского информационного агентства Day.Az.
Причиной атаки является позиция Day.Az в освещение российско-грузинского конфликта.
По словам главного редактора Day.Az Эльнура Баимова, хакерские атаки с «российского направления» имели место с первого дня конфликта, но в настоящее время масштабы DDOS-атак однозначно свидетельствуют о том, что речь идет о группе, которые регулируются из единого центра.
Напомним, что в течение последних двух дней российские спецслужбы вывели из строя информационные и государственные сайты Грузии.

«Мы вплотную заняты увеличением технических возможностей и будем противостоять атакам. Приносим извинения читателям за некоторые неудобства. Самое главное то, что наше дело правое», сказал Э.Баимов.

Тамилла

Day.Az

Eyewitness: Scenes of panic in Gori

Russian jets have bombed targets in the Georgian town of Gori, about 25km (15 miles) from the intense fighting in South Ossetia. Here the BBC's Richard Galpin describes chaotic scenes in Gori on Saturday.

We saw the impact of the air strikes - buildings on fire. We could hear the Russian jets above us. In one air strike the pilot missed the intended military base, instead hitting two apartment blocks.

When we arrived flames were pouring out of the buildings and people were still trapped inside. A woman begged the firemen and soldiers around her to help find her family. She said she'd gone into the burning apartment block but had not been able to find them.

We saw injured civilians being pulled from the buildings. There were clearly a number of serious injuries. We were told by Georgian soldiers at the scene that civilians had been killed in these apartment blocks and we saw at least one man pulled out dead.

SOURCE: BBC NEWS

О насильственном банкротстве ОАО «Южная Осетия»

ЮЛИЯ ЛАТЫНИН /Кандидат филологических наук, известный журналист и писатель. Обозреватель «Новой газеты» и ведущая передачи «Код доступа» на «Эхо Москвы»./

Президент Саакашвили одержал для президента Медведева победу над российскими силовиками; если Медведев воспользуется плодами этой победы правильно, то последствия его победы будут значимы не столько для Тбилиси, сколько для Москвы.

Почему — над силовиками? Потому что я никак не могу назвать режим в Южной Осетии хотя бы сепаратистским. Кто там, собственно, сепаратисты? Начальник тамошнего КГБ Анатолий Баранов раньше возглавлял ФСБ Мордовии, начальник МВД Михаил Миндзаев — аппарат МВД Северной Осетии, министр обороны Василий Лунев был военным комиссаром Перми, а секретарь Совета безопасности Анатолий Баранкевич — бывший заместитель комиссара Ставропольского края. Кто там осетинский сепаратист в этом правительстве? Премьер Юрий Морозов, что ли? Однако, увы, я также не могу назвать этот режим пророссийским. Наоборот, все действия президента Кокойты в последнее время противоречили интересам России на Кавказе, начиная от выставления России на позор всему миру и кончая возбуждением напряженности в той точке, которая может Россию развалить. Южная Осетия — это не территория, не страна, не режим; это совместное предприятие чекистских генералов и осетинских бандитов по освоению денег на борьбу с Грузией.

Собственно, что потрясает больше всего в этой истории — это отсутствие каких-либо стратегических целей у южноосетинских властей. Саакашвили и Путин встречаются в Москве — а потом в Южной Осетии на выборах взрывается телевизор. Это называется — троцкизм. Не было команды, чтобы телевизоры взрывались.

Россия отменяет войну в Абхазии — и тут же возрастает напряженность в Южной Осетии, из Цхинвали начинают обстреливать грузинские села, а после ответного огня тут же обвиняют Грузию в агрессии. Да мало того — на следующий день после обстрела президент Кокойты оказывается не на переднем крае, не в госпитале, а за тысячу километров тяжелых горных дорог, в Абхазии, где он, видимо, спешит предложить российским силовикам свой народ в заложники, в качестве альтернативного инструмента для нагнетания ситуации и освоения бабок.

Еще раз: все действия Южной Осетии не имели никакого смысла с точки зрения стратегии. Они имели смысл только как способ зарабатывания денег. А деньги немаленькие: только новый газопровод, пущенный по горам, чтобы снабжать газом 7 тыс. жителей, если Грузия вдруг отрежет им снабжение, стоит 570 млн долларов. А есть еще секретный бюджет на борьбу — как считается, в районе 800 млн долларов. А есть еще пенсии и зарплаты бюджетникам, которые выписывают на 80 тыс. населения, хотя реально в республике живет не больше 30 тысяч.

Когда нам говорят об обстрелах Цхинвали, важно представлять себе, что такое Цхинвали. Это не город где-то там в центре республики, который обстреливают диверсанты. С трех сторон Цхинвали окружен грузинскими селами, последний городской дом — это и есть укрепленный пункт. Из города стреляют по грузинским селам, грузины в ответ подавляют огневые точки. Чтобы грузины стреляли не по городу, достаточно было вынести эти самые огневые точки на сто метров вперед. Но основной принцип террористов, излюбленный ООП и «Хезболлой», в том и заключается, что вы устраиваете огневые точки в мирном жилье, а когда в ответ стреляют по вам, вы радостно тащите трупы собственных детей под телекамеры. Тот же принцип террористов исповедует Кокойты. Если Южная Осетия — государство, то тогда это государственный терроризм.

Когда нам говорят об обстрелах «мирных жителей», важно понимать, что в Южной Осетии мирных жителей сейчас ровно столько же, сколько в палестинских лагерях беженцев. Южная Осетия, как и Организация освобождения Палестины, — не государство, не этнос, не территория, это особая форма парагосударства, где жители превращены в военизированных беженцев. Это квазивойско, руководитель которого не может позволить своим подданным заниматься ничем, кроме войны, которая делает его власть абсолютной, а деньги, имеющиеся в его распоряжении, — бесконтрольными; и где истерия замордованного населения является главным способом пополнения личных счетов.

Но более всего потрясает то, что руководители этого совместного предприятия — несмотря на все свои крики, — судя по всему, не готовились к войне и оказались абсолютно беспомощны. При первых признаках насильственного банкротства гендиректор предприятия попросту удрал из Цхинвали. Меня абсолютно потрясло ночное известие о том, что российские журналисты сидят, мол, в Доме правительства, а там отстуствуют бомбоубежища. Это что значит? Все деньги, которые отпускались нашему СП, шли на Рублевку? Кричали-кричали «волки, волки» и даже сарая для овец не могли построить?

Грузия в любом случае выиграет этот конфликт по одной простой причине: у Грузии в нем есть ясная стратегическая цель. У российских силовиков такой цели не оказалось. Более того, выяснилось, что вся эта публика, которая горазда банкротить заводы и кошмарить бизнес, — в столкновении с настоящей армией драпает без оглядки и все, что может, — это жаловаться в ООН. При столкновении российских силовиков с грузинскими войсками получилось то же, что у арабов с Израилем.

Похоже, наши силовики искренне полагали, что война — это вранье. Бесконечное вранье о «беспричинных обстрелах», о раненых «мирных жителях», которых показывают тут же, на фотографиях, в камуфляже. Они не отвыкли от этого и сейчас: чего стоит хотя бы заявление о грузинских самолетах, ночью разбомбивших колонну с гуманитарной помощью, шедшую от Рокского тоннеля. Покажите мне того генерала — Морозова, Баранкевича или Баранова, — который распорядился в эту ночь, когда после объявленного Саакашвили моратория из России в Цхинвали пошли танки и тяжелая техника, — покажите мне того генерала, который стал забивать дорогу еще и гуманитарной колонной. Если он это сделал, его надо как минимум разжаловать в рядовые за глупость. Наши силовики полагали, что войну выигрывает тот, кто больше врет. Саакашвили полагал, что войну выигрывает тот, кто ее выигрывает.

Последние события показали, что Россия не контролировала то, что делает Кокойты. Грузинский министр по урегулированию конфликтов Тимур Якобашвили приехал в Цхинвали на переговоры, и российский МИД сделал все, чтобы эти переговорые обеспечить, — а Кокойты попросту уехал из Цхинвали. Саакашвили объявил об одностороннем прекращении огня — в ответ, для поддержания кредитоспособности предприятия, был открыт огонь по Тамарашени и Приси. Будем надеяться, что Грузия разглядела точно, что часть Кремля как минимум не собирается поддерживать Кокойты. Можно поддерживать союзника, можно содержать марионетку. Нельзя поддерживать совместное предприятие по выкачиванию бабок из российского бюджета путем поджигания Кавказа.

Еще раз: президент Саакашвили обанкротил для России совместное предприятие лубянских чекистов и осетинских бандитов. Никаких интересов России в этом предприятии не было. Интересы этого предприятия имели к интересам России не большее отношение, чем интересы раковой опухоли — к интересам организма. Мы можем лишь поблагодарить президента Саакашвили за сеанс химиотерапии.
Очевидно, что в сложившейся ситуации самый главный вопрос следующий: что будет делать Россия. У России есть два варианта. Один — это ввязаться в войну, тем самым делая ровно то, чего добивались последние несколько месяцев российские силовики. Совершенно при этом неважно, кто эту войну выиграет и какие при этом будут жертвы. Сам факт такой войны означает, что контроль над Россией сохранят силовики. Спецслужбы и Путин. Силовикам даже выгоден позор России: в таком случае крику, истерики и денег будет больше.
Второй вариант — это шанс для президента Медведева и для России. Невмешательство России в войну — это поражение силовиков. А возможно, и банкротство головного офиса на Лубянке — ведь южноосетинское предприятие было лишь филиалом.

SOURCE: http://www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8288

ახალი ამბები

თბილისი, 9 აგვისტო /”ახალი ამბები - საქართველო”/. სამხრეთ ოსეთში შექმნილ ვითარებასთან დაკავშირებით, საქართველო ერაყში სამშვიდობო მისიით მყოფ კონტინგენტს სრული შემადგენლობით გამოიწვევს, რომელიც 2000 სამხედრო მოსამსახურეს ითვლის, იუწყება სააგენტო ”როიტერი”.
”ბრიგადა სრული შემადგენლობით გაემგზავრება ერაყიდან. ჩვენ ველოდებით ამერიკულ მხარეს, რომელიც ჩვენს ტრანპორტირებას უზრუნველყოფს”, - აცხადებს სააგენტო, კონტინგენტის სარდალზე დაყრდნობით.
გუშინ საქართველოს ეროვნული უშიშროების საბჭოს მდივანმა ალექსანდრე ლომაიამ განაცხადა, რომ საქართველო ერაყიდან კონტინგენტის ნაწილს - ათას სამხედრო მოსამსახურეს უკან იწვევს.

თბილისი, 9 აგვისტო /”ახალი ამბები - საქართველო”/. საქართველოს შსს-ს სასაზღვრო პოლიცია რუსეთ-საქართველოს საზღვრის დაცვის გაძლიერებულ რეჟიმზე გადავიდა.

როგორც ”ახალი ამბები - საქართველოს” კორესპონდენტს შსს-ს სასაზღვრო პოლიციაში განუცხადეს, მესაზღვრეების დამატებითი ძალები გადაყვანილია სახელმწიფო საზღვრის დასაცავად. რუსეთ-საქართველოს საზღვრის დასაცავად, ზემო ლარსის, ზემო აფხაზეთის, ჯავა-ონის, ასევე ჩეჩნეთ-დაღესტან-ინგუშეთის მონაკვეთზე მობილიზებულია მესაზღვრეთა სათანადოდ გაწვრთნილი სპეციალური რაზმები.

ამ დროისთვის მიმდინარეობს გაძლერებული პატრულირება. საქართველოს სახელმწიფო საზღვარზე კონცენტრირებულია საზღვრის დაცვის უახლესი საშუალებები.

მაუწყებლობა წყდება

”საქართველოს მთავრობის გადაწყვეტილებით, ხვალიდან შეწყდება რუსული არხების მაუწყებლობა საქართველოს ტერიტორიაზე. ასეთი გადაწყვეტილება იმით არის განპირობებული, რომ რუსული ტელეარხები დეზინფორმაციას ავრცელებენ სამხრეთ ოსეთში მიმდინარე მოვლენებთან დაკავშირებით”, - განაცხადა საერთაშორისო მედია-ცენტრის ხელმძღვანელმა გიორგი გაბაშვილმა.

”ბოლო დღეებში რუსული მედია და, განსაკუთრებით, ტელეარხები საქართველოს წინააღმდეგ ნამდვილ საინფორმაციო ომს ახორციელებენ, ამიტომ, ჩვენ მივიღეთ გადაწყვეტილება, შევწყვიტოთ შაბათიდან ყველა რუსული არხის მაუწყებლობა საქართველოს ტერიტორიაზე”, - განაცხადა მანამდე საქართველოს უშიშროების საბჭოს მდივანმა ალექსანდრე ლომაიამ.

SOURCE:http://www.newsgeorgia.ge/

SOUTH OSSETIAN ISSUE

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